When Senator McConnell recently and aggressively needled Norm Ornstein at an AEI event, the coverage first settled on the jibe, and then, a little later, on the Senator’s denial that his position skeptical of campaign finance disclosure had changed for 25 years. All interesting or entertaining enough, but the Senator said more about his objections to campaign finance regulation—all government involvement in campaign finance, including disclosure and public financing—and it is well worth close attention.

Campaign finance jurisprudence is intensely concerned with free speech rights, less and decreasingly with associational rights, and not at all with a more comprehensive conception of the requirements for conducting political action—“doing politics.” Why this is so is worth exploring. Something is missing here, and the gap is consequential.

No one questions that campaign finance law has struggled through multiple, agonized revisions in distinguishing issues from campaign speech and the discussion of campaign issues from advocacy for candidates or parties. The statute is little help; it speaks of the “purpose of influencing” an election,” 2 U.S.C. §431(8)(A)(i), and broader Commission glosses on the phrase, such as a test for whether a message was “electioneering” in content, eventually came to grief. The Supreme Court held the express advocacy line briefly, then gave in to a conception of the “functional equivalent” of express advocacy, and has since cast much of discussion into obsolescence by extending to corporations the right to make independent expenditures. Now tax policy-makers and tax law face pressure to work through the same issue, in limiting political intervention by 501(c)(4)s, and the results might be expected to be the same.

A champion of campaign finance de-regulation, Senator Mitch McConnell has set his sights on discrediting one facet of the reform program—disclosure—that the Republican Party long proclaimed it could live with. He suggests a change of heart brought about by the misdeeds of political adversaries, but others have noted how the Republican turn-about on disclosure coincided with the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United. So it is worth considering again whether the case the Senator is making is an example of anti-reform politics, significant more as a tactical exercise than a serious statement of constitutional principle or public policy.

One theme in the narrative about the IRS is that it faces a special challenge in enforcing the (c)(4) rules in the wake of Citizens United. A (c)(4) organization, which is typically a corporation, can make independent expenditures, so long as this campaign activity and others do not make up its primary purpose.

Two basic reform models have been advanced to protect against the misuse of these nonprofits to make these and other campaign-related expenditures. One is that the Service should generally employ more rigor in rooting out organizations that have exceeded their limit for political activity. Another is that the IRS should change its rules, switching the test from a "primary” social welfare purpose to an "exclusive one" without any campaign activity mixed in, and rid itself of the problem altogether: effectively, the no-tolerance option.

In both cases, however, the proposed solutions may have to scale steep walls erected by Supreme Court precedent. These issues have to be taken into account in judging the role that IRS enforcement can play in campaign finance regulation.