In the growing press about polarization on the Supreme Court, campaign finance cases are cited as leading indicators and McCutcheon as a clinching bit of proof. The argument comes in two different versions. In the standard form, the Court is simply charged with dividing, routinely and reflexively, along partisan lines. A pointed variant is that the Court majority has exhibited something like fierce ideological bias, demonstrating through its campaign finance and voting rights cases that it will favor the rich donor but won’t protect the average, poor or minority voter.

Justice Stevens delivered brief testimony to the Senate Rules Committee, taking no questions. Maybe no exchange with the committee members was needed: he said little that was surprising or required elaboration.  He had made public before his proposed constitutional amendment and the analysis he offered in support of it closely followed his lengthy dissent in Citizens United. As a retired justice, displaying extraordinary energy and commitment, he certainly brings attention to his cause, but he won’t convince many not already in his corner, and the weaknesses in his case will be turned against the project, whatever its merits, of moving a constitutional amendment.

In a close and insightful  reading of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in McCutcheon, reproduced here with his permission from the election law listserv, Marty Lederman has called attention to this first paragraph:

There is no right more basic in our democracy than the right to participate in  electing our political leaders. Citizens can exercise that right in a variety of ways: They can run for office themselves, vote, urge others to vote for a particular candidate, volunteer to work on a campaign, and contribute to a candidate's campaign. This case is about the last of those options.

The State of Ohio is playing for time in its defense of its “false campaign statements” statute. It wants the case now before the Supreme Court decided on ripeness, win or lose; it wants to hold off a decision on the constitutionality of its law.  Some, Rick Hasen among them, believe that this might work.  But then again, it might not, and the law could well be put out to pasture without further ado.  The petitioner has argued in clear terms that the law is unconstitutional and that, on this point, the recent decision in United States v. Alvarez is dispositive.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6-7, Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S.Ct. 895 (2014) (No. 13-193).  And the Court could agree, motivated as well to spare the petitioner another expensive, time-consuming tour through the courts to win the victory that it is virtually guaranteed.

Rick Hasen has made an important contribution to the debate about McCutcheon by astutely identifying an issue that had gone mostly unremarked—the Court’s choice to reduce the doctrinal heft of the “appearance of corruption” in step with its narrowed view of “actual corruption.”  With the equation of “actual” corruption with quid pro quo corruption, Rick believes, the concern with appearances had to take up the slack in addressing “the public’s concern that money can skew legislative outcomes.”  Twice in his piece, Rick refers to a “stand-in” function for appearances—a role in standing in for the decimated actual corruption standard that is no longer capable of dealing with the “broader concern about undue influence.”