Beyond the various points of disagreement between Chief Justice Roberts’ plurality opinion and Justice Breyer’s dissent in McCutcheon, there is one striking, overall contrast to be drawn. Roberts makes a clear case against the aggregate contribution limits but, as Justice Thomas suggests, he may be less straightforward in revealing his doctrinal ambitions.  Breyer’s jurisprudential orientation is no mystery, but his defense of it, in the particulars, is a puzzle.

A few key points that emerge from a first reading of the Roberts opinion:

1.  The Standard of Review for Contribution Limitations

The Court decides not to address the question directly and so it leaves undisturbed, at least in formal terms, the different standards of review, one rigorous and one less so,  employed for "contributions" and "expenditures," respectively. At the same time, one might ask whether, in any practical application, the differences between these standards matter much at all. This is because the Court continues to insist on a very rigorous definition of the necessary government interest in regulation – actual quid pro quo corruption of candidates or its appearance – and it also rules out an expansive use of anti-circumvention theories, usually highly conceptual as in this case, as a means of satisfying the requirements that any regulation of speech be "closely drawn" to match the government's interest. There will be ample debate in the coming days about whether the Court has effectively adjusted the burden against the government in contribution cases without actually tampering with the standard of review.

Back and forth go the arguments over alternatives to the current Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence.   The scholarship it produces can be interesting, and the passions behind it lively, but the question always remains whether constitutional theory can result in manageable guidance to the Court.  This key question is one that Larry Lessig and others advancing an originalist anti-corruption theory of jurisprudence have had difficulty answering.  Without this answer, their work encourages hard-core opponents of any regulation to believe, or to claim, that  the alternative to Buckley—and to the current Court’s gloss on Buckley—is effectively limitless government authority to restrict spending on politics. 

The Center for Responsive Politics and the Sunlight Foundation have teamed up to preview the consequences if the Supreme Court in McCutcheon eliminates the biennial aggregate limit. Their work is the latest of a number of analyses predicting trouble without the limit.  It is also the most recent of its kind to exhibit the flaws in these predictions—and to suggest that the real concern with McCutcheon may lie elsewhere.

Public Citizen attempts to make the case that the Supreme Court's pending decision in McCutcheon could, if wrongly decided, unleash a flood of money with the probable effect of corrupting the political process. The argument is the one heard before in briefs and in oral argument about joint fundraising committees. A donor who gives to a joint fundraising committee can write a check for millions, to be apportioned within the limits among all the joint fundraising participants. Public Citizen warns against "naïveté": the more “practical” view it urges is that the officeholder who solicits for the joint fundraising committee risks corruptive indebtedness to the donor.