Brody Mullins of The Wall Street Journal  will not suffer for any lack of attention to his front page story today, and not only because of placement. “Interest Groups Gain in Election Cash Quest” at A1.  He declares that independent interest and ideological groups have feasted on McCain Feingold to fatten at the expense of political parties.  527s continue to form, joined by tax-exempt (c) organizations, and they are spending without limit on the air and in the mails, acting like parties but without their funding restrictions or disclosure requirements.  Mullins reads the data over  a number of cycles and finds the conclusion unmistakable: reform has elevated the role of outside groups at the expense of the parties.

   Mullins is sure to have an argument on the numbers and on the interpretation.  Almost immediately after McCain-Feingold was enacted, observers with affection for the reforms and often a role in bringing them about built their case for its “success”.  The law was hailed as a tonic for parties instantly motivated to modernize, use technology, hunt for new, smaller dollar sources of support. They were seen to raise money than ever before the new-fashioned way, breaking reliance on the “soft money”  that special interests had once ladled out in defiance of the law and as an act of legalized bribery.  In this space, the debate was traced and joined, as here, here, and here (among other examples). The parties had entered a New Age, stronger, well-financed and, better yet, dealing in the right kind of cash. 

   All along a turn in the argument, subtle though it may have been, exposed a less confident side to this advocacy.  For example, some put considerable weight on the parties ability to make unlimited “independent” expenditures, that is, independent from their own candidates, an act of separation that parties take solely to escape the law’s limits.  It is strange that this would be applauded as a strength of parties, and it was by no means a triumph of McCain-Feingold which had sought to limit this spending but could not get this past even the McConnell Court.  In other words, parties retained this weapon despite and not because of the law, and it was important to them because the law had cut their funding, slicing out the soft money portion, and increased the value of the “independent” option. 

   Mullins may well have somewhat overstated McCain Feingold’s hand in the misfortune of parties and the good fortune of the “groups”.  Parties have had their work cut out for them for a long time: the competition has gotten quite stiff, the  field of battle volatile and configured unfavorably, and this has been true for some time.  The law has mirrored their troubles and added to them—it has made them far worse-- but it did not exactly create them.  For parties the challenge has been to hold a committed membership and expand its numbers as a large number voters increasingly shop with either parties for whatever of interest is on display.

   Among the better examples are the national committees of the major parties, each of which fares best when one of its own wins the White House, and--especially on the Democratic side but on both sides overall--not so well at other times when it is reliant on a loyal membership and not on incumbent officeholders.  The Congressional committees, which are incumbent committees at all times, are stronger by far, but they owe this health mostly to clout and much less so to an impassioned rank-and-file following.  It is not only this following that has proven inconstant.  In recent years, we have also seen how large donors once active in the parties have shown an increased interest in funding independent activity outside parties, preferring to bypass them for what is seen to be more focused, more efficient and better managed independent group activity.

   Parties, reformers like to say, have “adapted” skillfully to changed conditions. When they “adapted” with soft money, however, they were called on the carpet, this source of funds classified as unhealthy to the parties and dangerous to the Republic, and the reforms of 2002 were enacted. The parties were expected to adapt once again, on an approved plan, replacing the large dollar with small and acting as reform advocates thought that parties should behave.  They have done the best they could. 

   But so have the independent groups.  Mullins suggests that their time has come, courtesy of McCain Feingold. 

   He will have an argument on this point, a vigorous one familiar in all its main parts, delivered by the usual and well-schooled advocates who have beat their drums for years for the efficacy of McCain-Feingold.  They will argue that the fundraising and spending numbers are more properly seen another way; that the parties have innovated with much success and to the benefit of us all; and that independent activity is merely a symptom of breakdown or weakness in the law, remediable by the next round of reforms. 

   The law, however, cannot do much to help the parties, and it is limited, constitutionally, in what it can do to inhibit their independent competitors.  The most that can be hoped is that the campaign finance regulation should do as little harm as possible.  By that measure, McCain Feingold cannot be favorably judged.

Bob Bauer