Evaluations of public financing, such as those recently in Florida and Arizona, usually show that the criteria for judging these laws are neither settled nor, in specific cases, consistently applied.  The Center for Competitive Politics, for example, which devotes a fair amount of energy to pointing out the problems with “clean elections” laws, tends to dwell on their failure to deliver transformative changes in government.  Other criticisms are centered more on problems with public financing laws’ mechanics: expenditure limits that are too high, or party spending allowances that serve as the channel for excessive private spending.

     Of course, the two sets of criteria are related: a public financing system, supporters might say, could deliver transformative changes if “loopholes” were closed and the mechanics improved.  Nothing will happen to satisfy the concerns:  these criteria guarantee that if success or failure, in the sense of a decisive judgment, is to be delivered, public financing will come up short. 

     A public financing system is not likely to transform government:  it may contribute, in ways not reliably measured, to sounder government, operating in subtle conjunction with other factors.  But this will always be a point of contention.  And, while the mechanics can always stand improvement, the adjustments will not drive private money out of the so-called “system”, and anyone looking for inefficiencies and defects in the design or implementation of these systems will find them.

      Public financing systems launched or defended on grand promises are certain to run into trouble.  And this is the beginning of a dilemma for public financing supporters: legislature of this nature is not easily enacted or sustained without making the case for rich benefits.  The case is made boldly, in expansive terms; but the case boldly, expansively made is open to damaging attack, sooner or later.

      But now, with all the experience of recent years at both the federal and state level, there may be an opportunity to make the case realistically and still succeed.  To some degree, public financing is a choice candidates might make to escape a larger or smaller share of the fundraising burden and to free time for contact with voters and the business of government.  To some degree, it provides seed capital to candidates who need time to demonstrate their promise.  It can be seen to represent a public investment, not exclusive in character, in campaign financing alternatives that will include, inevitably, a substantial private component, but are not for that reason gravely deficient.

     How much of an investment the public will be prepared to make on a realistic basis remains to be seen.  But the case for public financing can be a strong one, especially if it is realistic:  tat is, if it summons public support on the argument that in political reform, differences in degree do matter and small successes can, however mysteriously, add up.

Bob Bauer