Robert Samuelson wrote a column in defense of lobbying.  It is, he says, "democracy in action," and the larger the government, the more there is—necessarily.  He also defends the lobbying art as more substantive and oriented to argument on the merits than often thought, and he believes that the influence of lobbyists, particularly those for the wealthy, is overstated. 

     Conservative defenders of lobbying, admirably standing up for free speech, often in the same breath blame the size of government.  The argument shows well when first brought out.  Then it becomes less clear that it is true—or even logical. 

     If government expands, then, for sure, affected interests will rally to be heard.  Those interests, or others, will not go quietly if government growth is restrained:  the mission, then, often is to enlarge government’s role.  Lobbying is not merely a reaction to the size and role of government.  It is one of their causes.  And there are times, of course, when the goal of the lobbyist is to shrink the government or limit its power.

     Samuelson’s point, a fair one, is that not all activity that goes by the name of lobbying is bad.  Or even that any of it is.  But this does not refute the case one hears for controls on lobbying through measures to exclude certain means, e.g., gift-giving, or to compel disclosure of others, or to be attentive to conflicts of interest.  Samuelson does not really say what he thinks of these controls:  he is reacting, as far as one can tell, to rhetoric which spreads what Samuelson refers to as "myths."

     What Samuelson further omits is any discussion of the uses of political argument about "interests".  He seems to believe that this argument is hollow if it is embraced within a larger case for activist government.  This case, Samuelson suggests, is divided against itself because it warns against interests at the same time that it creates the conditions for them to thrive. 

     It’s a simple point, deceptive in its simplicity.  Strong government is not incompatible with a recognition that active government depends on rules and processes to hold policy-making to elemental standards of fairness and transparency.  

     To the contrary:  a government committed to ambitious goals should be especially committed to these standards.  It does not have to stand against lobbying, or deny the existence or claims of interests, to make this commitment.  It certainly is not destined to fall into the trap of imagining that smart people in office should be left unbothered to do their work.  In setting expectations about how it will manage pressures for action, it is explaining the ground rules, as it should, and giving definition to its style of governance.

     Samuelson worries about "myths":  he means exaggerations about the nature of lobbying and its harms.  Myths can express a truth:  a summons to "reality" is not innocent of oversimplification.  He accurately exposes distortions in the view of lobbying, the "myths," but his "reality" is also out of kilter.  To have "democracy in action" is to both have respect for organized interests and to work out intelligently terms of access and participation. 

Bob Bauer